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NAVY/MARINE CORPS TACAIR INTEGRATION:  






The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
overview regarding the current issues regarding Tactical Aircraft Integration within the 
Department of the Navy.   This project was conducted with the sponsorship and 
assistance of the Comptroller, Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific.  The goal of this 
project was to identify issues and provide an analysis of the ongoing efforts between the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  Four criteria were set aside for deliverables: 1) Produce key 
documentation, most notably the Memorandum of Understanding and the Memorandum 
of Agreement; 2) Produce any milestones or timetables required for integration; 3) 
Discuss issues regarding funding and resource allocation as applied to the integration 
process; 4) Provide information on requirements for integrating operational and 
supporting activities. 
 
This project delineates a brief history of the operational requirements of the F/A-18 and 
what necessitated changes within the TACAIR community.  The topics covered will 
explain how the plan was developed based on key assumptions and challenges, the 
implementation of the transformational plan to date, current funding issues, an analysis 
with recommendations of the transformational process, and an overview of the cultural 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) required the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) to reduce its expenditures based on a reevaluation of the threats to the 
United States and to develop a way to integrate its entire aviation structure. The 
Department has chosen to cut some of its expenses by consolidating the tasks of the 
Strike Fighter Community within the Navy and Marine Corps by putting squadrons from 
both services in the other’s deployment cycle.  There is a definite opportunity to reduce 
expenditures, but it will come at a price. There is the inherent rivalry between the 
services and pride in the way they each approach their respective missions.  The senior 
leadership has agreed on the concept of Tactical Aircraft integration; however, there is 
the challenge of getting the air wing communities to accept the imminent change.   
The topics covered within this paper will explain the need for transformation, how 
the plan was developed, key assumptions and challenges, the implementation of the 
transformational plan to date, funding issues, an analysis with recommendations of the 
transformational process, and an overview of the cultural change that will inevitably 
come with the transformation.  In order to accomplish the research required for this paper, 
the project needed a team with unique backgrounds and perspectives to thoroughly 
analyze and document the integration process to date.  The team was comprised of a 
Naval Aviator with twelve years operations experience, two Marine Corps Aircraft 
Maintenance Officers with a combined eleven years experience, and a Marine Corps 
Comptroller with more than five years experience in his field.   
Numerous hours were spent researching information regarding the integration 
process; from online sources and periodical literature, to official Department of the Navy 
message traffic and memorandums.  As the project progressed, personal interviews and 
discussions with pilots and maintenance personnel from the Navy and Marine Corps 
revealed unique perspectives on the integration plan.  Navy and Marine Corps 
Comptrollers at group and wing level provided insight into the issues surrounding the 
funding process and what impact integration may have on the established methodology 
for transfer and handling of funds.  Further insight was gained through discussions with 
Marine Air Group’s and Navy training squadrons’ operations departments and the lack of 
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information they possessed regarding the integration plan.  Naval Training and 
Administration of Reserves (TAR) flight operations personnel at squadron and wing level 
were contacted for information regarding the restructuring of the reserve commands and 
the impact of integration thus far.   
Most information appeared to be held at the higher offices of the Naval aviation 
community, where lead members within the Marine Corps’ Aviation Plans, Policies, and 
Programs (APP) and the office of the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) were able 
to provide guidance and information that enabled the project team to build a solid 
foundation in analyzing the integration plan.  The project’s research culminated in team 
members attending a Tactical Aircraft integration conference, led by the head of the 
integration process for the Marine Corps from APP which highlighted key issues that still 
need to be addressed.  Attendees of this conference ranged from Squadron, Group, and 
Wing Commanders to senior enlisted personnel.     
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NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION 
 Power in the world had begun to shift in the late 1980s. The Soviet Union had 
disbanded and left the Eastern European countries to make fundamental changes in their 
governments and thus modify their alliances. The first Gulf War proved the United States 
was capable of waging and winning a full fledged war, integrating its air, sea, and ground 
combat elements. The U.S. led forces faced an Iraqi Army, war hardened by years of 
conflict with Iran and other neighbors. The Coalition used superior air power and then 
overwhelmed the enemy’s ground forces using speed and precision strikes. This swift 
success occurred during the initial stages of the downsizing process within the United 
States’ Department of Defense (DoD). The Gulf War had also affected the perception of 
power within the Arab countries. The United States found itself the sole superpower.  
Transformation was inevitable, for both the victors and the defeated. Was there a threat 
now and, if so, from whom?  Was there a justification for the many multi-million dollar 
defense programs being funded?  These were questions Congress, the military, as well as 
the public, were asking themselves.  
 The U.S. military was forced to rethink their strategy for fighting a war against an 
uncertain enemy. Each branch of service had to look at their strengths and reduce their 
expenses and expenditures yet still be capable of accomplishing their mission. The 
Department of the Navy (DoN) looked at the services under it, Navy and Marine Corps, 
and decided to reduce the redundancy in the way they executed their respective missions. 
Aviation was one of the key elements which had overlap between the services. Within the 
rotor wing community, there was no redundancy in aircraft; however, in the fixed wing 
community redundancy flourished with the F/A – 18 Hornet.  
The F/A - 18 operationally entered the U.S. arsenal in 1983. Both the Navy and 
the Marines showed interest in purchasing it and intended to use it in different methods. 
The Navy decided to use the aircraft as an air-to-air fighter and an air-to-ground bomber. 
Its multi-mission capabilities would allow it to replace the A-6 as well as the F-14 on the 
carrier.  The Marine Corps had a different mission in mind, close air support for the 
Marines on the ground.   
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 If both services had the same aircraft, it stood to reason pilots could be trained to 
fly either mission, which would provide both services with more flexibility at a lower 
cost to the DoN.  This understanding led to the development of the Navy and Marine 
Corps Tactical Aircraft Integration (TAI) Plan.  The plan would alleviate the service 
specific missions and would assign Marine Corps squadrons to the Carrier Air Wing as 
well as forward deploying Navy squadrons with the Marine Air Wing.   
The awareness of the overlap in capabilities of the services provided an 
opportunity for joint training. Both services realized there was room to make significant 
savings in the active duty as well as reserve components of their air force. One such 
method of savings was for the Navy and Marine Corps to reduce the number of active 
and reserve squadrons.  By doing so, deployment issues would need to be addressed.  To 
account for this, the Navy would assign three fighter squadrons to the Marine Corps Unit 
Deployment Program (UDP). In turn, the Marines would augment the Carrier Battle 
Groups (CBG) with a total of ten F/A-18 squadrons.1  Currently, squadrons undergo a 
demanding deployment rotation. The Navy squadrons look forward to a sea rotation 
every 18 to 24 months. The Marines have a similar rotation with the difference of 
possibly including a UDP cycle.  By pooling the squadrons capable of doing the same 
mission, the hope is to minimize the financial impact on the personnel and equipment. 
Training would not have much of an impact on budget constraints based on the 
fact Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR pilots are trained jointly through the point where 
each student pilot is qualified in the F/A – 18 at the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS).  
There are three such squadrons; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar and Naval 
Air Stations (NAS) Lemoore and Oceana. Upon graduation from one of these schools, 
officers are designated as Pilot Qualified in Model (PQM).  They then continue on to a 
fleet squadron, where they will be instructed in the tactics and methods of effectively 
employing their aircraft as part of continued training. 
Given pilots already receive the same foundation for their skills, one could 
assume there is a good basis for the integration process. The pilot training is actually the 
easiest part of the entire plan.  The change and acceptance of the other service’s culture 
may be the most significant hindrance to the entire plan. This, as well as plan 
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development, challenges faced, and assumptions made all have a significant impact on 
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PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
 In 2001 the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) Tasked the DoN to find a way to 
integrate its entire aviation force structure.  This integration would have to seek 
efficiencies in the utilization of DoN resources while still being able to maintain an 
effective force.  The DoN granted this task to the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval 
Warfare Requirements, and the Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for 
Aviation.  The services then contracted Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc. to conduct a 
study which would help answer the DPG tasking and to determine whether efficiencies 
could be translated into a reduction in aviation expenditures. This study would be focused 
solely on fixed wing tactical aviation (TACAIR) since it represented the most significant 
portion of the overall aviation budget.2   
 The study’s aim was to determine how to get the maximum utility out of the DoN 
current fixed wing assets and the new incoming JSF.  An important issue at the beginning 
of the study was to find out what each service’s TACAIR capability requirements were.  
It was learned the Navy’s capability was to provide sufficient strike power to the carrier 
battle group (CVBG).  The unified combatant commander was the primary customer and 
the missions included all aspects of the theater war plan including strike operations.  The 
Marine Corp’s capability requirements, on the other hand, were different.  Its main focus 
was on providing direct support to the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) 
through close air support typically given by the amphibious ready groups (ARG) via the 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) AV-8B Harrier.  Since the missions of both services 
were different, as well as a separate aircraft already being utilized, it was determined that 
two variants of the new JSF would be needed.  The Marine Corps would require a variant 
with Short Take off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capability to replace the Harrier, 
while the Navy would require a variant with carrier-compatible (CV) capability.   
 The Marine Corps requirement for the STOVL variant was examined and it was 
evident the MAGTF heavily depends on fixed wing aviation for firepower and fighter 
support.  Responsiveness is a key attribute of firepower only STOVL satisfies.  The 
STOVL variant is the only way to provide fixed wing capabilities in the ARG/MEU, 
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especially those without support of a CVBG.  The fixed aviation capable ships (LHA, 
LHD) do not carry catapults or arresting gear, making it impossible for non-STOVL 
variants to fly off these ships.  
 The Navy’s distinct performance requirements for CV variant was also examined 
and justified.  The data provided to the study team proved the requirement and expected 
performance for un-refueled range and endurance for the CV variant exceeded the 
requirement for the STOVL by approximately 50%.  The internal payload of the CV 
variant exceeds the STOVL variant by 100 %.  In addition, the required launch distance 
for the STOVL variant under a variety of conditions would have a negative effect on the 
operations of the non-STOVL variants on the flight deck.  These differences emphasized 
a need for two variants of the JSF.  Utilizing only one version of the JSF would result in a 
decrease in effectiveness for both services. 
 Once the requirement for the two JSF variants was briefed and accepted by both 
service chiefs, the new challenge was to determine the affordability of the two JSF 
variants.  An analysis was conducted of the current APN1-4 funding for FY02.  The 
results showed that with the current fixed wing assets, the FY02 budget would total to 
$6.2 billion in FY02 dollars.  It was also determined, with the new JSF, the required 
budget would only have to be $3.2 billion in FY02 dollars.  These savings would be 
reached by the lower maintenance dollars spent on newer aircraft and also the lower 
quantity of JSF aircraft needed to accomplish current missions. There would also be a 
reduction in overhead costs due to the elimination of aircraft not in the operating forces.  
This meant that by integrating the two JSF variants between the two services there would 
be a savings of more than $3 billion in FY02 dollars. 
 The study team came up with six recommendations to answer the DPG’s task.  
These final recommendations were first presented to the CNO and the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps (CMC) and then briefed to the Secretary of the Navy.  The study’s first 
recommendation was to decommission three active Navy squadrons and two reserve 
squadrons.  One of the reserve squadrons would be Navy and the other would be a 
Marine Corps.  This would reduce the force from sixty-four squadrons to fifty-nine. 
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The second recommendation was to reduce the number of aircraft in F/A-18 from 
fourteen to twelve and the JSF squadrons form twelve to only ten.  Next they 
recommended aircraft overhead be reduced from 95% to 62%.  This reduction would be 
made on authorized active and reserve structure.  The transformation of business 
practices was highly stressed in inventory, supply management, training, and test and 
evaluation.  Their fifth recommendation was to integrate ten Marine squadrons into Navy 
air wings (one per air wing).  Their last recommendation was to integrate three Navy 
squadrons into the Marine UDP rotation program. 
From this report and the subsequent briefings, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
and the Secretary of the Navy stated the commitment to integration (Appendix A).  
Furthermore, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) by the Deputy CNO (Warfare 
Requirements and Programs) and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation delineated 
responsibilities for the affected platform and a projected timeline for integration 
(Appendix B).  Key issues noted in the report and the MOA stated certain assumptions 
provided a foundation for developing the TAI plan.  These assumptions may lead to 
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ASSUMPTIONS and CHALLENGES  
Some key assumptions were made in the development of the plan in order to 
maintain the scope of the project.  Transformation and change were paramount 
throughout these assumptions which impacted not only other communities within the 
aviation field, but within the services and how they did business.  These assumptions 
included revising current inventory planning factors based on ongoing business practices 
and increased capabilities of future aircraft, and given these increased capabilities, there 
would be a maximization of combat power to forward deployed forces.  From this, a 
direct measurement could be obtained using today’s force capabilities and comparing it to 
the projected force structure.  Even though there was a projected force structure for the 
aircraft, CVBGs and ARGs were to take into consideration the use of reserve units as 
sources of trained aircrew rather than having unit replacements.  The ships of the 
projected force were also to mirror today’s forces and each TACAIR squadron had at 
least 10 aircraft.  Finally, the UDP cycle was to continue based on the requirement to 
support a Korean conflict. 
While some of these assumptions are valid (e.g., how the ships mirrored today’s 
forces and the capabilities of today’s forces were to be comparable to the projected 
forces’ capabilities), others are too fluid and have the potential to cause problems with 
the integration process.  The most possible scenario for causing the most problems is the 
use of reserves as active duty aircrew.  While novel in its simplicity and originality, costs 
associated with this assumption are the attrition of personnel within the reserve 
community and increased training costs of adding a reserve squadron to the training cycle.  
Marines and sailors do not join the reserves to be out to sea for 6-8 months with an 
additional 6 months of workups.  Personnel coming into the reserves and transitioning 
from active duty to the reserves will either avoid the service all together, or choose a 
different career path.  It’s very likely that the cost of the training cycle, parts, fuel, man-
hours, etc., of turning a reserve squadron into a deployable squadron would nearly negate 
the estimated savings of decommissioning an active duty squadron.    
Other challenges begin to surface when discussing the integration of different 
services.  While it is clear the TACAIR integration plan is theoretically an increase in the 
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strategic use of naval assets, the reality of the plan is it will transform the culture within 
the Navy and Marine Corps.  These cultural changes will reach far beyond aviation 
because the Marines consider aviation an extension of their infantry.  Given the fact 
every Marine is a rifleman, the infantry has confidence their air support will be there 
when called upon.  There is skepticism as to whether the Navy will be able to provide the 
same level of support to the ground forces.   Representative Neil Abercrombie, D-Hawaii, 
the ranking member of the House Armed Services Tactical Air and Land Forces 
Subcommittee expressed these concerns during the questioning of Lieutenant General 
Michael Hough at the April 2, 2002 budget hearing.  Additionally there is fear within the 
Marine Corps that this marks the beginning of the end of Marine Corps Aviation.  This 
belief was demonstrated in the remarks below made by Norman Polmer, a military 
scholar and author of a history of carrier aviation.  
It's the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard.  If you integrate, what's the 
need for Marine air?  The reason for Marine air is to support the grunts 
[infantry].  If you start to put them together [with the Navy], you lose the 
uniqueness of the Marine air.3   
 
The implementation of the TAI plan is still in its early stages, but to date the DoN 
has created a sense of urgency and is actively lining up sponsorship.  The following quote 
from Lt. Gen. Hough is indicative of the upper echelon’s outlook on the future. 
 [W]ith the looming procurement bow wave, there is no way for the Navy and  
 Marine Corps to survive independently…4 
 
The DoN is aware the success of the integration depends on lining up sponsorship and 
building a strong coalition. The MOU discussed earlier was only the first step in the 
building of this coalition.  In a concentrated effort to gain the support of their 
stakeholders, both the Navy and Marine Corps have released articles in numerous 
publications since the signing of the MOU.  These articles have been published in such 
places as to reach both the junior and retired officers of the TACAIR community, such as 
The Hook Magazine, which is the official magazine of the tactical aircraft community, 
Airforce Online Magazine, and the Marine Corps Gazette.  The following are examples 
of such releases: 
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By removing the traditional barriers between Navy and Marine Air, we 
will be able to surge resources into what ever mission needs help.5 
– Admiral Vern E. Clark 
Airforce Online Magazine, 2002 
 
My philosophy for success of Marine Aviation is a single Naval Solution 
using one team and one vision, which will provide a more capable force, 
to ensure better utilization of our precious assets.6 
– Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough 
 The Hook Magazine, 2003 
 
These quotes are trying to gain support by showing the need to separate from the 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
 Still considered to be in its infancy, the integration process informally began in 
1997 when the four Marine Corps squadrons entered the carrier deployment cycle.  With 
the official memorandums between services in 2001, the concept was legitimized and the 
aforementioned plan emerged.7  However, a plan is worthless without the ability to carry 
it to fruition.  This responsibility is being undertaken by the implementation team.   
 The Navy and Marine Corps implementation team is still in the developmental 
stages and will consist of three subcommittees called Cross Functional Teams (CFT) 
(Appendix C).  The responsibilities the CFTs will be as follows; Team 1 - Doctrine and 
Training, Team 2 – Organizational and Personnel, Team 3 – Material and Facilities.  
These teams are projected to meet semiannually and will focus on their assigned areas 
while assessing the impact of their recommendations on other areas.8  These teams will 
report to an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), who, in turn, will report to either 
HQMC, Aviation Plans, Programs, External Matters and Budget Branch (APP), or 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (N-40). 
 In October 2003, the two services met again to discuss the integration process.  It 
was at this point that the task of implementing the two TacAir communities was passed 
from the Pentagon level to the Commander of Naval Air Forces (NAVAIR).  An 
additional outcome of the meeting was that the members of the CFT’s were identified and 
charged with finalizing their charters.  The members were then tasked with identifying 
issues that might pose potential problems to the integration process and assigning 
personnel to research them.9   
 With regards to a timeline for the implementation plan, there has been no visible 
effort at this point to establish a Plan of Actions and Milestones that would allow the 
Executive Steering Committee to track the integration’s progress.  They have, however, 
suffered their first set back in a Congressional postponement of the decommissioning of 
the Reserve F/A-18 squadron, which was set to begin a series of cuts and 
decommissioning within the reserve force structure.  Senator Zell Miller, D-Ga, has 
requested legislation that would “require the Secretary of the Navy to submit two reports 
90 days before any reductions to Reserve assets occur. The reports would clarify the 
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Navy’s aviation force structure plan for the next five fiscal years and explain plans for 
better integrating the Reserve into active-component operations.”10   
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FUNDING ISSUES 
 The allocation of funds for DoN aviation assets begins at the Undersecretary of 
Defense (Comptroller).  For west coast naval aviation squadrons, OSD allocates the funds 
to the Financial Management Branch (FMB).  FMB then further apportions the funds to 
Commander Pacific (COMPAC) Fleet who then allocates the funds to Commander, 
Naval Air Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC).  COMNAVAIRPAC at North Island will 
lastly provide funding in the form of Operating Budget to both Navy and Marine Corps 
Squadrons.  COMNAVAIRPAC also has the responsibility to comply with the Anti-
Deficiency Act (31 US Code 1517).11  For Marine Squadrons in the West Coast the 
funding will initially be passed to Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) in Hawaii.  
MARFORPAC will then pass those funds to 3rd Marine Air Wing.   
According to TAI proponents, the plan will permit a $35 billion (FY02) savings 
over the life of the program.  This will be achieved by a 38% procurement reduction of 
the JSF and a 16% procurement reduction of the F-18, culminating in a total reduction of 
497 aircraft or about 30%.   
A very important issue that must be addressed is the effectiveness of a 
numerically smaller TAI force and whether it should be required to fight two regional 
conflicts at the same time, even with improvements in modernizations.  Will it have 
enough aircraft to fight and win?  The advocates of this integration argue that this 
numerically smaller than previously planned force will provide more forward deployed 
DoN strike fighters due to the new plan’s enhanced capability of the TAI force.  They 
also argue that another positive attribute of the plan is the improved ability to assign 
aircraft from one service to meet the needs of the other should there be that need.  
Although many arguments could be made both for and against TAI, the reality is there 
are many important issues both services need to work on, seeking out mutually beneficial 
solutions to any obstacles faced.  
Another vital issue that cannot be ignored is whether the integration will be cost 
effective.  Will the cost impact be worth the resulting change in the entire DoN Strike 
fighter capability?  Although the DoN estimates that the plan will reduce the Strike 
Fighter procurement cost by about $35 Billion, it cannot be ignored that the plan will also 
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create additional Operation and Maintenance (O&M) dollar spending.  Annual military 
aircraft Operation and Maintenance costs have been growing in recent years, mainly due 
to older aircraft.  However, new models of aircraft have proven to be more expensive to 
operate and maintain than originally planned.   When additional Marine Corps Squadrons 
integrate into Navy Carriers they will incur additional costs, which they will not be able 
to pay for with their pre-integration operating budget.  The main question will be how 
will the DoN address this funding gap?  Both Navy and Marine Corps squadrons will 
most likely spend out their normal operating budget and wait for additional funding 
through a supplemental later in the year.  Historically the Marine Corps has not received 
major monetary cuts from the DoN.  This however might change when the DoN begins to 
find ways to fund its JSF procurement plan.  When this happens, Marine Corps aviation 
will have to take its share of funding cuts along with other Naval aviation units.   
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ANALYSIS and RECOMMENDATIONS 
In conducting an analysis of the recommended plan and the integration process as 
a whole, the “10 Commandments”, or criteria, for implementing change will help to 
establish whether the integration process is on the right track.12  Reinforcing these criteria 
will be a modified version of Nadler and Tushman’s Congruence Model to help 
understand the capabilities of the organization (Appendix D) and a measurement of the 
resistance to change.13  While not every aspect of this model is identified within the 
“commandment” framework, the essential elements within input, transformation, and 
output are identified.  It should also be noted some of the framework criteria may explain 
more than one part of the organizational model.  A final analysis is given based on the 
implementation of two changes within a concurrent timeframe.   
1. Analyze the Organization and Its Need for Change. 
As stated earlier, the Defense Planning Guidance 2001 established the requirement 
for transformation throughout the Department of Defense.  Along these lines, the 
Department of the Navy sought to eliminate redundancy within its two branches.  
Fiscal constraints helped to drive the need for change given the expense of procuring 
both a new fighter aircraft along with legacy aircraft. 
2.  Create a Shared Vision and Common Direction. 
The shared vision and common direction is found within the MOA.  In sum, it states 
the integration process will enable the DoN flexibility to provide “dominant and 
decisive offensive power” from nearly any location.14  This point is further 
emphasized in the articulation by senior flag officers describing the integration 
process: 
 
 [The] naval services can have a significantly more capable force 
with fewer aircraft because of the great increase in combat 
capability of the current and next generation of tactical aircraft 
when armed with precision munitions.15 
– Vice Adm. Michael G. Mullen 




 TACAIR integration allows us to better meet our 21st century 
requirements while simultaneously increasing efficiencies, 
unifying our core naval aviation competencies, and maintaining 
our unique Marine expeditionary culture.16 
– Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough 
Marine Corps Gazette, 2002 
 
As part of the inputs for understanding the capabilities of the organization, this aspect 
is especially important in signifying change is coming. 
3. Separate from the Past. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended.  However, the manning, 
organization, and equipment utilized by the United States after the end of the Cold 
War remained the same.  The Secretary of Defense has taken on the task of 
redesigning the Cold War force into something more expeditious and efficient.  The 
need to conduct operations effectively and efficiently was exemplified by the manner 
in which the United States conducted the first Iraqi conflict in the early 1990’s, and 
has become even more apparent during current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Numerous lessons were learned as a result of these conflicts, paramount being the 
need for joint operations and a detachment from the half-century train of thought 
dictating large scale operations.  Smart weapons, surgical strikes, and a highly mobile 
force have demonstrated a capability to scale down forces and maintain a well-trained, 
well-equipped, lethal fighting force. 
4. Create a Sense of Urgency. 
The Deputy Commandant for Aviation has stated that with the current Program of 
Record and procurement issues looming within the near future, there is “no way [the 
Navy and Marine Corps] can survive independently.”  With the fate of Naval 
Aviation resting on the outcome of transformation, the sense of urgency is paramount. 
5.  Support a Strong Leader Role. 
Currently it is difficult to determine if there is a single lead in the TAI plan.  It can be 
said, however, certain de facto leaders are raising awareness and are pushing the 
integration process.  A key example would be Lt. Gen. Hough in his push to get the 
message out in specific publications having a very definite demographic perspective 
  21
(Marine aviators, retired Marines, active duty personnel within the naval service).  In 
recent months, change teams have begun to form and take the lead in implementing 
the TAI plan.   
The second input criterion in the model (Leadership) ensures commitment to 
change is supported from the top down.  During the TACAIR Integration conference 
held in October, 2003, the need for leadership among the Cross Functional Teams 
was addressed with senior Navy Commanders and Captains and Marine Corps 
Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels taking charge of specific issues and seeking out 
CFT personnel to help address and provide possible solutions.  Seeking out these 
assignments as collateral to regular duties, these senior officers are essential in adding 
economies of scale to the change endeavor, representing the major commands having 
a stake in the integration process.  Without such strong leadership present, there 
would be little to no follow up and no reason to ensure change is brought about. 
6. Line Up Political Sponsorship. 
Proponents of change are legion.  From the President of the United States and 
Secretary of Defense down to the junior military officer, there echoes the need to 
transform the fighting forces.  Few would argue change is not necessary given the 
current world climate, particularly since the attacks which occurred on September 
11th, 2001.  Yet there is an undertone that permeates throughout the ranks when 
discussing the integration plan.  The MOU and MOA both emphasize the 
commitment to change for the betterment of the DoN.  The Deputy Commandant for 
Aviation has sought out the press to spread the word, but, unfortunately, it has not 
been enough to bring to light the necessity for integration.  Misconceptions abound 
concerning the TAI plan.  Norman Polmer’s previous citation and the statements 
made by naval aviators are excellent examples of the misunderstanding surrounding 
TAI.17  Buy in among target groups and individuals (retired pilots, scholars, former 
aviators within Congress) will enhance the message and provide substantial backing 
for continuing the integration process to the whole naval aviation community. 
This is the critical task essential in implementing the strategy of the organization.  
Potential cost savings and the avoidance of an aircraft procurement bow wave help 
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provide a stimulus for political sponsorship, as well as enhancing a sense of urgency 
within Congressional budget authorization and appropriations committees.  The 
perceived savings could be redistributed to other Defense programs.  Conversely, 
opponents to increased Defense spending will see the savings as a potential increase 
for their programs, whether it be cutting taxes or increasing spending on education.  
Without political sponsorship, the organizations efforts will be severely limited and 
change may not take place.  The other part of the model this fills is within the 
informal organization.  Retired personnel, scholars, Congressional personnel, and 
other major stakeholders have a loud voice throughout the transformation process.  
With this power behind the leaders, change will not occur. 
7. Craft an Implementation Plan. 
The implementation plan was first drafted with the MOA and further expounded to 
include plans of action and milestones (POA&M) and responsibilities for each 
affected community.  On paper, there is the potential for success; however, rarely 
does a plan survive first contact with reality.  In this case, there appears to be a 
smooth and methodical pace by which the two services are conducting the integration 
process.  Enough time has been factored into the process to allow for deployment 
cycles to continue, maintenance issues to be dealt with, but most importantly, enough 
time has been given in order to allow for the incorporation and transition to the JSF.  
In a culture of “hurry up and wait”, this is a noteworthy outcome. 
The second critical task in the organizational model, the implementation plan will 
provide a good measure of whether the transformation is a success or failure.  While 
models exist which may parallel the current process, this aspect can only be measured 
as a success or failure in hindsight or when the process is stalled. 
8. Develop Enabling Structures. 
Two enabling structures were developed to further the TAI plan.  The first was the 
integration of the four Marine Corps squadrons in 1997.  The success of this pilot 
program has increased the chances for success in the ongoing integration process.  
The second enabling structure is in the creation of the Cross Functional Team’s 
Executive Steering Committee which will monitor information flow within each 
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Cross Function Team, and will promote and stimulate information throughput 
between them to cover the overarching issues that may require two or more teams to 
address.  While each CFT is its own entity, communication between teams will be 
essential in ensuring success. 
This aspect could be equated to the strategy envisioned in the model.  The final aspect 
of input in analyzing the capabilities of the organization, it is not the least.  It is the 
primary focal point of initiating the change as envisioned by the leaders. 
9. Communicate, Involve People, and Be Honest. 
While honesty is rarely a problem with signed memorandums, the largest problem 
with this item is the communication.  Those who will be most affected by the 
integration process (crewmembers) are unaware as to the reasoning for integration.  
Operators within the community feel the process is maintenance driven based on the 
aging legacy airframe.  They are unaware as to the reasons delineated in MOU and 
MOA.  Without this knowledge, resistance to change will flourish.18   
10.   Reinforce and Institutionalize the Change. 
Although the integration process is still in its infancy, Navy and Marine Corps senior 
officers are committed to making this work.  Comments by the Marine Corps Deputy 
Commandant for Aviation and the Chief of Naval Operations show integration is 
essential for the survival of naval aviation and, by signing the MOU and MOA, have 
expressed their commitment to ensuring it happens.   
As the output, or performance aspect, of the organizational model (Appendix D), this 
criteria measures the success or failure of the transformation, whether in hindsight or 
throughout implementation. 
 
 Culture as it relates to transformation is one of the leading contributors or 
detractors in the TAI plan.  As it is spread throughout the framework as previously 
analyzed, a separate section will address the issues and problems with cultural change on 
the informal organization.  
 The resistance to change method analyzes the current state of the plan with the 
formula DxVxFS>R, where D is the dissatisfaction with the current state, V is the clear 
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and understood vision, FS is the first steps toward vision, and R is the resistance to 
change.  Resistance is further broken down into fear and distrust at the individual level, 
poor communication and collaboration at the organizational level, and how the 
environment is influencing the change.   
 In terms of the TAI plan, there is a high level of dissatisfaction (D) with the 
current state of affairs based on costs of future procurement and the need to transform the 
military.  This dissatisfaction is such that senior officials have recognized that without 
action, a backlash will occur, particularly with the procurement and implementation of 
the JSF that will increase costs and decrease efficiency.  The vision (V) aspect is 
moderate for two reasons.  While the vision is clear in its presentation based on the joint 
vision delineated in the MOA and MOU, the reason this is not given a higher rating is it 
is difficult to find anyone who knows what the vision entails.  One solution to decrease 
this problem is the initial articulation through the FRS and periodic updates to the fleet 
operators.  If this is achieved successfully, the vision aspect will increase, providing a 
higher chance of success.  The first steps (FS) are given a high value based on the initial 
four Marine squadrons being integrated, as well as the creation of the CFT.  This is also 
rated high based on the speed at which the process is flowing.  It is not going so fast as 
there is a fight, but it is calculated and progressive.  In terms of resistance, this would 
currently be given a high rating.  Fear and distrust is high at the individual level with a 
misunderstanding that this change signifies the end of Marine TACAIR and 
communication has not been open both at the individual and organizational level.  
Environments influence is low with little resistance in the incorporation of the JSF and 
subsequent decommissioning of the legacy aircraft.   
 Both services need to be aware of the drawbacks which may occur during the 
period when the JSF is introduced to the fleet inventories (Appendix E).  The bottom S-
curve represents TACAIR integration with the F/A-18 aircraft.  Overlapping is the top S-
curve, representing the JSF transition.  There is inevitably going to be a period of 
learning how to effectively implement the aircraft as well as how to phase out the legacy 
aircraft in order to avoid creating a gap in support to the fleet units.  When the new 
aircraft arrives in the fleet, TAI cycles will have been implemented for at least four years. 
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This is definitely not enough time to have worked out all the bugs of the change; however, 
the major headaches should be out of the way.  The focus of TAI can then switch to only 
dealing with the new aircraft and not worrying about acceptance of a new way of 
conducting business.  The biggest challenge throughout this timeframe will continue to 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  27
CULTURAL CHANGE 
Two points are key elements to understanding cultural change and its impact on 
the TAI plan.  The first is the sociological impact of assimilation and the subsequent 
issues in understanding the merging of two cultures.  The second key element is the role 
of assimilation as it pertains to historical identity and participational identity. 
 Perhaps the most important concept related to change is assimilation.  
Assimilation can be defined as a convergence between two different populations, so, at 
the extreme, the distinction between them disappears.  The definition is typically used to 
describe ethnically diverse populations, yet it can be used whenever there are two distinct, 
and possibly divergent, cultures.  While the definition provides an extreme example 
yielding a complete loss of identity, it may be closer to reality than anticipated.  Perhaps 
the best quote presented thus far was by Polmer when he said if “you integrate, you lose 
the uniqueness of the Marine air”.  Representative Abercrombie’s skepticism as to 
whether the Navy will be able to provide the same level of support to the ground forces 
based on the Marine’s culture of “every Marine a rifleman” further lends credence to the 
issue regarding integration of TACAIR, but more importantly, cultural integration.  
 A main factor described in noted sociologist Milton Gordon’s research on the 
theory of assimilation19 can help to explain why the cultural change between the two 
branches of the military is of such a concern. This factor is known as identificational 
assimilation.  Two kinds of identificational assimilation can be used for describing the 
cultural changes surrounding the TAI plan: "historical identity" and "participational 
identity."  Historical identity is the identity of the culture based on the length of time a 
culture has existed.  In the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps, the culture goes back 
well over 200 years.  The participational identity as it relates to the naval service can be 
explained given the tactical missions and common ground both branches share.  
Examples of both can be shown given the expeditionary and amphibious nature of the 
Marines explaining the former and the common basic aviation schools for pilots and 
maintainers explaining the latter.   
 As noted earlier, the cultures of the United States Navy and Marine Corps are 
deeply rooted in tradition, customs, and courtesies going back hundreds of years.  This 
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historical identification will actually play a positive role in integration process and the 
resultant cultural change.  There has always been a perceived delineation between the 
Navy and Marine Corps, despite both branches belonging to the Department of the Navy.  
Perception of the TAI plan has been that it signifies the beginning of the end of Marine 
aviation, but there is more at stake than just the fate of Marine aviation.  Marines 
continually hear about how a congressperson, journalist, or public servant questions the 
need for the Marine Corps.  Whether true or not, these stories have perpetuated among 
the ranks for generations, but the Marine Corps has remained intact.   
 Further identification is rooted in the lore of the Marine Corps.  Historical 
reference is used to explain not only an evolution in tactics and customs; it is used to 
explain items such as the blood red stripe on the dress uniform for non-commissioned and 
commissioned officers and the officer’s sword.  It is stories such as this that will ensure 
the historical identity of the Marine Corps is differentiated from the Navy.   
 The largest obstacle the TAI plan must overcome deals with participational 
identification.  As stated earlier, there is common ground between the Navy and Marine 
Corps, particularly as it relates to the aviation community.  Marines and sailors are 
trained at the same schools within the aviation community, both officer and enlisted, 
pilots and maintainers.  However, once the Marines and sailors reach their respective 
fleet units, differentiation in mission (long range strike vs. CAS), doctrine (deep strike 
capability vs. expeditionary maneuver), and primary customer (Combatant Commander 
vs. MAGTF Commander) is readily apparent.  To overcome the problems with 
participational identification, the Navy and Marine Corps are developing a new 
framework with which to operate.  Called Expeditionary Strike Force, the core concepts 
are to exploit complementary capabilities of carrier strike and expeditionary strike groups, 
merge power projection capabilities of both branches, and maximize the flow of combat 
power ashore.   
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CONCLUSION 
 Based on the change in world events and the transition from legacy aircraft to the 
Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of the Navy needed to initiate a change that would 
enable it to continue in a more efficient and effective manner.  The Defense Planning 
Guidance of 2001 provided the impetus needed for the Department of the Navy to 
develop a plan which would allow it to succeed in changing while diminishing the costs 
typically associated with such large organizational change.  The result was a report 
generated by Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc., that made some key assumptions 
following broad operational requirements, while other assumptions were made based on 
ideal scenarios.  Assumptions such as the capabilities of today’s forces were to be 
comparable to the projected forces’ capabilities were conservative in nature, while the 
more ideal assumptions, such as the decommissioning of reserve squadrons and using the 
reserve aircrew as part of the active component, have already hit a setback with 
Congressional challenges based on restructuring the reserve component. Resistance to 
change may have irreparable consequences, particularly without buy-in from Congress 
and their constituents.  These challenges must be overcome and met by strong leadership 
to prevent undermining the transformational process.  Such leadership can be found 
through the introduction of the Cross Functional Teams early in the integration plan and 
other proponents of change including Lieutenant General Hough.  Funding issues have 
arisen within the scope of TACAIR integration based not only on the current methods of 
allocation of funds, but also within the realm of overall cost effectiveness in the long run.  
Operations and maintenance costs continue to increase, not only in older aircraft, but in 
aircraft with increasingly more complex components and systems.   
 Further analysis has shown that another inhibitor to change within the Tactical 
Aircraft Integration plan is the number of changes occurring within a short time frame 
(integration and incorporation of the JSF) and the effect of these changes on the culture 
of both services.  To mitigate the impact on culture and the potential backlash, continued 
and improved communication among a critical mass of participants and strong leadership 
will stimulate a successful change.  Currently, the plan is supported by strong leadership, 
but the integration message is not circulating as it should in the Navy and Marine Corps.  
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Various documents mention the plan as a part of other aviation related changes and 
scenarios without going into the depth required to document a large scale change.  This 
could ultimately cost the Navy and Marine Corps time and money for crisis management.  
By enhancing the amount of information to participants within the entire Naval and 
Marine Corps aviation community, chances for success would increase exponentially.  
We recommend such action. 
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TACAIR INTEGRATION TEAM 
• The Tactical Aircraft Integration Team (TAIT) is established under the 
authority of DC, Aviation and DCNO (N6/N7). 
• Commander, Naval Air Forces is the Navy’s lead agency for TAI. 
• HQMC, Aviation Plans, Programs, External Matters and Budget Branch (APP), 
and Commander, Naval Air Forces (N-40) will jointly administer the TAIT. 
• The TAIT ESC will act in an advisory role and be kept abreast of the 
developments and progress of the TAIT. 
• The TAIT may form subgroups, in addition to the CFTs, to examine specific 
short-term issues as necessary. 
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